

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**ENHANCING THE STRATEGIC APPLICATION OF
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS CONCEPTS**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Enhancing the Strategic Application of Effects-Based Operations Concepts

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Enhancing the Strategic Application of Effects-Based Operations Concepts

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 42 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Our National Security Strategy summarizes the complexities of our world stating that the U.S. must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. We must act in alliance or partnership with others, but will act unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand. Regardless of when, why, or how we assert our influence around the globe, the U.S. must develop a system that integrates and synchronizes our various elements of power in a way that maximizes the potential for achieving the desired effects, while minimizing the associated costs and risks in attempting the same.

This paper will examine how effects-based operations (EBO) can provide the critical common frame of reference that will enable effective integration of our national elements of power. We will define the concept of EBO, examine how it might apply in the global environment of today and that of the not-too-distant future. We will look at how it relates to the effective application of our national elements of power to achieve desired strategic effects, and then identify some of the gaps and weaknesses in our current civil-military command structure that could impede the harmonious application of our national elements of power.

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PREFACE

Every day the world seems to be getting more and more dangerous while becoming less and less responsive to the interactions and processes that, in the past, seemed to stabilize conflict and strife. While effects-based operations may not necessarily be the absolute answer to every situation, it is glaringly clear that unless we find a way as a nation to efficiently integrate and synchronize the application of our nation's resources and elements of power, waste and ill-effect will surely be the byproduct of our efforts.

This paper is a first attempt at outlining the nature of the problem inherent in our nation's role as the sole super power and how we might apply our national elements of power more effectively in achieving our national goals.

This project would not have been possible without the astute guidance and thoughts of Col Gary Snyder, the voluminous feedback of Col Larry Kauffmann, and a good measure of support and patience on the part of my wife and kids, Lisa, Devon, and Logan.

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ENHANCING THE STRATEGIC APPLICATION OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

PURPOSE

Headline news stories continually provide stark reminders of what some have called the continuing rate of decay in the condition of the human experience. The world we live in, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Cold War, has become increasingly complex, confusing, and dangerous. Terrorism, cross-border aggression, famine, ethnic cleansing, regional financial crises, and a host of other problems present the United States (U.S.), as the last remaining super power, with a complex backdrop against which involvement must be balanced with an ever dwindling reservoir or resources.

Our National Security Strategy (NSS) summarizes this seemingly daunting task by stating "we must deploy America's financial, diplomatic and military resources to stand up for peace and security, promote global prosperity, and advance democracy and human rights around the world."¹ It further elaborates that in response to threats and crises that the U.S. "must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools – diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures, law enforcement, intelligence, military operations and others. We must act in alliance or partnership when others share our interests, but will act unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand."² Regardless of when, why, or how we apply our influence around the globe it is imperative that the U.S. develop a system that integrates and synchronizes the application of our various diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of power in a way that maximizes the potential for achieving the desired effects. Achieving this effect while minimizing the associated costs and risks in attempting the same is the challenge (Fig 1).³

This paper will examine how the military concept known as effects-based operations (EBO) may be applied to enable the effective integration of our national elements of power. In order for the EBO concept to achieve a higher degree of synchronization in the efforts of the various combatant commands and numerous civil departments and agencies at the national strategic level, some crucial organizational changes need to occur. We will begin by examining the global




FIGURE 1 ELEMENTS OF POWER

environment and some of the trends and characteristics that demand an ever increasingly effective national level integration and synchronization of our elements of power. Next, we will define some of the key concepts of EBO and examine how they might apply in the global environment of today and that of the not-too distant future. We will look at how EBO relates to effective application of our national elements of power to achieve desired strategic effects. We will then identify some of the gaps and weaknesses in our current civil-military command structure that could impede the harmonious application of our national elements of power. Finally, we will hi-light recommendations for enhancing the structure and processes used at the national strategic level.

THE NEW GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

The global environment we live in today is characterized by many of our top thinkers and strategic leaders as being volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. While this seems to be axiomatic from almost any perspective you consider, it is important to be able to identify specific areas that may be likely to effect our national interests or our options when applying our national elements of power in support of those interests. There are several questions we must consider in trying to provide clarity to this vague notion that things aren't as simple as they used to be. First, what areas are most likely to threaten our national interests or our ability to effectively apply our national elements of power. Second, what is it about today's environment that requires us to take a holistic approach to resolving the many problems we may face. Third, which of our national elements of power (departments/agencies) are likely to be called upon in any given crisis?

CONFLICT, STRIFE, AND GLOBALIZATION

Many of today's global problems can be related in one way or another to two phenomena. The first phenomena was the destabilizing effect of the disappearance of the bi-polar order that existed during the Cold War. With the removal of the Soviet influence over their long-time client states came the geometric rise of ethnic, religious, political, and economic strife as those same states struggled for their own identities. This same period witnessed a tremendous increase in the emergence of new states which were either unsustainable economically or were born through force. Often, these new states failed, dissolving back into chaos as quickly as they had appeared. A second equally important factor to consider has been the effect technology has had on the world's economic, communications, and transportation infrastructures. This effect is best described by the term globalization. These two phenomena together make for a world

where conflict and integrated cross-national effects are the order of the day. As Deutch, Kanter and Scowcroft described in their book, "Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future":

An entirely new range of interrelated threats has also appeared, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the potential for "catastrophic" terrorism, conflict with "rogue" nations, and globally organized crime. These new threats are often accompanied by complex linkages between economic and security issues.⁴

The view of the world through the looking glass of national security is blurring many of the time-honored lines upon which departmental/agency responsibilities, planning, and budgeting have always been based. The lines between war and peace, domestic and international economics and law, combatant and non-combatant, friend and foe are becoming increasingly nebulous, indistinguishable, and dynamic.⁵ Additionally, the increased connectivity and interdependence of national economies, transportation, and information infrastructures throughout the globe will create potential for friction. Furthermore it will create an environment where effects from turbulent occurrences in one country will cause a ripple effect throughout dozens of national and international systems globally.⁶ While our own national economy was already showing signs of slowing down by late FY2000, recent assessments indicate that the economic impact of the World Trade Center (WTC) catastrophe could potentially push the U.S., and therefore the entire global economic web, into a full-fledged recession.⁷ A recession of even modest magnitude would throw the annual U.S. budget cycle into political grid-lock, leaving the funding of any new initiatives or the transformation of any governmental agency at the mercy of nervous appropriators.

The trend toward global interconnectivity means even the most simple crises will require the application of our national elements of power in a way that will most likely cross nearly every geographic, interdepartmental, interagency, and civil/military command boundary. The current war on global terrorism provides a great example. Operations against Usama Bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist network have been the most complex ever seen, requiring detailed integration of both domestic and international civil and military efforts. The U.S. government has created a global coalition, the size and complexity of which makes the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition pale in comparison. The operation has required extensive integration of the efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Justice (DOJ), and will eventually involve every U.S. military combatant command world-wide. The domestic aspects of the crisis have demanded close integration between Customs, the Department of Immigration

and Naturalization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and federal, local, and state law enforcement organizations.

Today, the U.S. has taken on a critical role as *the* sole super power. The last two versions of our National Security Strategy expanded the frequency and scope of areas in which the U.S. Government will commit our national resources. U.S. commitments will range everywhere from shaping the international environment diplomatically and economically, to responding to threats and crises at home and abroad, to preparing ourselves for an uncertain future.⁸ While fiscal constraints may temper the Bush administration's future appetite for global adventures that are not absolutely critical to national security, it is an unavoidable condition that today's environment will force the U.S. to continue getting involved on a global basis. It is imperative, therefore, that we find a way of coordinating the application of our national elements of power to react rapidly to crises and achieve our goals/objectives. We must capitalize on the synergism gained by the efficient integration and effective synchronization of these same elements of power without duplication, waste, or conflict (Fig 1).

CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

There is fairly wide consensus among many formal studies⁹ that although the United States will not face a global military near-peer competitor in the near-term, there is an increased likelihood that regional powers will challenge us, the incidence of failing states will increase, and there will be an increase in the frequency and intensity of non-state threats to our national security.¹⁰ In addition to these cultural and economic changes, the nature of the future battlefield is being shaped by what many are calling a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Many experts agree that there is an ongoing RMA that is fundamentally altering the way the range of conflicts of the future will be fought. These changes are being brought about by innovative applications of new technologies, dramatic changes in military doctrine, and new operational and organizational concepts. It is fairly widely accepted that these changes will result in the emergence of new warfare areas (long range precision strike, information warfare, dominant maneuver, and space warfare)¹¹ The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001) characterizes DOD's expectations for the future environment, outlining several worrisome geopolitical and military technical trend areas. These trends include diminishing protection afforded the U.S. by geographic distance, increasing regional threats from weak and failing states, the diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors, the increasing unpredictability of the locations of future conflict, the rapid advancement and ready availability of

military technologies, and the increasing proliferation of CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced explosives) and ballistic missile technology.¹²

Threat capabilities are expected to continue gaining ground while financial resources dwindle. The world is exponentially more unstable, violent and unpredictable with each passing year. The U.S. can not afford to continue relying on the traditional concept of attrition based annihilation warfare. The effects-based operations construct provides a shift in methodology that applies to all the national elements of power through integration and synchronization.

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Effects-based operations (EBO) holds tremendous potential for a new approach to planning, executing, and assessing the conduct of complex crisis operations. At the strategic level its power lies in terms of achieving effective integration and synchronization in the application of the various elements of national power. EBO is much more a shift in mind-set




FIGURE 2 PLANNING FOR EFFECTS

desired strategic outcome or 'effect' on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic level."¹⁴

Figure 2 shows how EBO takes into account the fact that each action has the potential for more than one effect and that particular effects may be influenced simultaneously by more than one action. Additionally, while some effects may be obvious and expected, others can be unexpected and/or even undesirable often resulting as 2nd, 3rd, or Nth¹⁵ order effects of an action or combination of actions and effects. Knowledge of our adversary is vital. Key to the entire process is our ability to clearly discern the connections between the desired outcomes in terms

of altered behaviors of our adversary, and the potential actions we can take to achieve the desired causal effects, and a sound ability to assess, monitor, and adjust effects application in near, real-time. These key elements comprise the EBO process.

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS PROCESS

EBO, much like other planning and execution models, is designed to be a continuous cycle. The first step is gaining full and near complete **knowledge** of the adversary. More than our current planning processes, EBO requires in-depth insight into the very nature of our adversary. Fusing available intelligence, information, and knowledge from every available national governmental source, and every private, commercial, and international source is necessary. EBO requires a complete and clear understanding of the political, military, economic, cultural, and informational environment that shapes the behavior of our adversary at any given moment.¹⁶ The next step of the EBO process is determining desired **effects** necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. The desired effects are determined based on detailed understanding of the adversary and his environment. This step in the EBO process defines how to shape the adversary's environment, through effects, in order to attain the desired objectives. This requires the identification of causal links between actions and desired outcomes. This analysis is the critical step where the full spectrum of our nation's capabilities will be needed to ensure the overall concept of operations is able to achieve the desired outcome.¹⁷ **Application**, the next step in the process, determine the best mix of our available national elements of power. It must be determined which combination of the nation's diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic (DIME) elements of power are best suited to create each necessary effect to achieve the desired outcome. As the process of applying the elements of power gets under way, the **assessment** step must immediately begin. Assessment allows the planner to gauge the efficacy of preceding efforts to predict the effects various planned actions will most likely have. If during assessment it is determined that the current approach is not fully successful, an




FIGURE 3 EBO CYCLE

adjustment may be made to assumptions, environmental factors interpretation, and/or balance of the application of our national elements of power to achieve success (Fig 3).¹⁸

Although EBO brings some significant differences in the way we will need to approach planning, it also entails a different way of prosecuting actions once we set out upon a planned course of action. EBO focuses on understanding the adversary as a complex interrelated network or as a system of systems. This shifts the focus from a target based approach to an approach aimed at the *means* of an adversary to conduct undesirable behavior. This approach is aimed at those effects that can impact his *will* to continue with that undesirable behavior.¹⁹ An adversary may have thousands of means (targets) that allow him to conduct war, but may only have a few dozen areas that could potentially be effected in a way that almost immediately saps his will to continue his desired course. EBO focuses on targeting those critically vulnerable areas so the effect created goes directly to the heart of the adversary's centers of gravity or will to continue. The two most critical parts of planning for EBO is in identifying the causal linkages between the desired outcome and those 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Nth order effects that could result in the desired outcome; and then in matching required effects with the most effective element of national power capable of achieving those effects.

Effects: Understanding The Adversary as a System of Systems

Many military theorists, planners, and practitioners are familiar with Colonel John Warden's five ring model for identifying and analyzing adversary centers of gravity. While




FIGURE 4 WARDEN'S COG MODEL

Warden's model is very effective at deconstructing the adversary's center(s) of gravity (COG) down into target sets, it misses, however, the relational network aspect of the adversary as a system of systems. Warden's model can be viewed as a series of inter-related concentric circles used to break the adversary down into ever increasing levels of detail. At the highest level, Warden's model depicts the adversary as five centers of gravity, the innermost circle representing leadership. The outer rings are

system essentials, infrastructure, population, and forces taking their place in the subsequent outer rings. For each particular higher-level COG, analysis could further identify COGs for each

of those, with target sets being developed in each category there-after (Fig 4). In the example in Figure 4, application of the Warden model would result in target sets for the various aspects of leadership that was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the adversary's infrastructure. The weakness in this model can be seen at the highest levels. There is a relational aspect in any system or organization between those elements Warden identifies as the COGs that his model or system doesn't adequately address or identify.²⁰ The form and substance of connectivity, dependency, and/or causality between the leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and forces for any given system is where potential strengths and/or weaknesses of our adversary may lie. Understanding the nature of this complex web of relationships is essential in determining causal connectivity between effects and desired outcomes.

A more effective model for envisioning or describing the enemy as a system of systems is Major Jason Barlow's National Elements of Value (NEV) with Interlinking and Variable Lines of Influence Model (Fig 5). This model captures the essence of the relational and causal connectivity between the adversary's various NEVs, and depicts that connectivity by showing relative importance of a particular element of value by its size. It also displays the relative importance of relational connectivity between elements by the presence and varying thickness of connecting links. In the example in Figure 5, the inference one could potentially draw would be that there

is some level of causal connectivity between the adversary leadership and its existing alliances, communications, and its forces. Additionally, the adversary in this model seems to be in such a state that the forces carry a greater degree of relative importance than does his transportation network, but that existing industry and alliances are also greatly important. Understanding the adversary as a system of systems to this level of detail will then allow us to determine which of our national elements of power will be applied against any given element of value of our adversary, thereby most likely to achieve the desired behavioral outcome in adjusting our adversary's will.²¹




FIGURE 5 BARLOW'S NEV MODEL

Application: Achieving the Desired Outcome

Detection, recognition and defining the linkages between the adversary's various NEVs allows us to take the next step, actually figuring out what to do to apply the effects that will achieve the desired outcome. Determining which of our national elements of power are most likely able to achieve a given effect; determining how, when, and where to apply them; synchronizing and integrating their use with the simultaneous application of one or more of our other elements of power; and then continually assessing and adapting in real-time their coordinated application as the adversary adapts and reacts, is crucial to realizing our desired end state and achieving the desired outcome. This problem of identification, selection, application, synchronization, integration, assessment, adaptation, and reapplication is not simple task. This complex application process could potentially require the integrated application of all of our national elements of power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)--in a cohesive, synergistic dynamically changing planning and execution environment. This could be even more complex than even this basic description makes it sound when dealing with crises such as our most recent global campaign against terrorism. This counter-terrorism effort, although only a couple months old, has already spanned the globe, crossing several geographic and functional unified command boundaries. It has involved the efforts of the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Justice, State, the Interior, and the Treasury and has required actions both internationally and domestically. There is now a new Office of Homeland Security, a new combatant command for homeland defense has been established, and there has been a formation and application of a system of alliances and a level of international cooperation never seen before. The main question now is, does our current civil-military command structure support the type of crucial coordination that must take place to make this an effective effort?

NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY STRUCTURES/PROCESSES

Our current civil-military and national security structures are very complex webs of relationships, responsibilities, authorities, and processes that have crucial organizational aspects. The overarching frame work within which all civil and military organizations operate are our national civil-military command and national security structures. The main elements are the National Security Council and the various agencies and departments, the Combatant Command structure as outlined in the Unified Command Plan and Unified Action Armed Forces, and the geographic organization of the Department of State as outlined in their most recent strategic plan. The key aspect in this portion of our assessment is on how the objectives of our

national security strategy are achieved through the processes of planning for the application of our various national elements of power during crises and contingency situations. What organizational elements, structures, and/or processes are in existence that would enable EBO planning and execution in support of our national priorities and objectives? In order to effectively focus on a given desired outcome, the efforts of all our national elements of power must have a common frame of reference. They must be applied through an efficient planning process, and must have the mechanisms in place to execute, monitor, adapt, and coordinate in real-time from the operational to strategic levels.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

The NSC, established by the National Security Act of 1947, was originally intended to "help the President coordinate the actions of government agencies into a single cohesive policy."²² Like every administration before it, President Bush, through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – 1, has reshaped the NSC and interagency process to suit his leadership style.²³ Although the "national security bureaucracy which exists today differs in important respects from the system that was in place by the late 1950s, what is most striking is not how much has changed, but how little."²⁴ Major changes under President Bush included the formation of 6 regional Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs), 11 functional PCCs, and the abolishment of the Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) that had been established by the Clinton administration.²⁵ Additionally, the centralized oversight function for ongoing contingencies that was established under Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC-56 was distributed to the regional NSC/PCCs.²⁶ However, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), Ms Condoleeza Rice, further clarified and expanded on the guidance in NSPD-1, adding four more functional PCCs, one of which was established to oversee contingency planning coordination (CP PCC).²⁷

The PCC is the base level for interagency coordination, and operates under fairly standard committee processes. Coordination of difficult policy issues that can't be resolved through the PCCs can be raised up through the NSC/Deputies Committee (DC) and NSC/Principals Committee (PC) to the NSC level.²⁸ One of the major stumbling blocks that the Bush administration is facing, like almost every administration before it, is the ability of this system of committees to be able to react swiftly and decisively enough, across departmental and agency boundaries, to reach consensus and formulate decisions and policies under time-critical crisis conditions. There is an inherent tendency for federal agencies to jealously shepherd their resources, especially when the problem is not necessarily in their area of

responsibility. One additional note, President Bush recently appointed former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as his Director of Homeland Security. Although a positive step, it is beginning to look more and more that this position will act merely as a coordinator, with no executive authority and very little, if any, budgetary authority.²⁹ Today's complex, environment, more than ever before, demands that we have a civil-military command structure and a national security decision making system that can deal with these continual crises that seem to have become the norm. An additional limitation to this newly created position, it is focused primarily on the domestic aspects of homeland protection, while the larger issues of coordination, integration, and synchronization of the application of our national elements of power in the international or global context lacks any comparable overarching structure.

CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

The structure, makeup, and coordination of the U.S. military's command structure and its connectivity with the National Command Authority are clearly outlined in several documents. Key among them, are Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces" (UNAAF), Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations,"

and the "Unified Command Plan" (UCP). At its highest levels, two




FIGURE 6 CHAIN OF COMMAND

distinct command channels characterize the civil-military command structure. While the military departments primarily operate in the realm of overseeing and directing the development, training, fielding, equipping and funding the forces of the individual Services, the unified command structure operates in the realm of the application of our military element of national power, both domestically and abroad in support of our national security and military strategies (Fig 6).³⁰ The current UCP divides the combatant command structure into four geographic and four functional combatant commands and one combatant command that has both geographic and functional responsibilities (Table 1). While not addressed in the current UCP, the terrorist attacks of September 2001 resulted in the responsibility for homeland defense being assigned

temporarily to JFCOM in his role as a geographic combatant commander. Permanent assignment of this responsibility will be determined with the completion of the ongoing revision of the UCP. This civil-military command structure, in meeting the requirements established for it by the National Command Authorities, must interface with other interagency departments and agencies both through the deliberate planning and crisis action response processes.

Combatant Command Structure	
Geographic Commands	Functional Commands
Pacific Command (PACOM)	Space Command (SPACECOM)
European Command (EUCOM)	Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
South Command (SOUTHCOM)	Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
Central Command (CENTCOM)	Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)	Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

TABLE 1 CINC RESPONSIBILITIES

further demands that “the use of the military instrument of national power as a component of the NSS requires the development of military objectives [and plans]. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.”³² While this same publication goes on to emphasize the importance of coordinating the efforts of the various elements of national power, stating “military operations must be synchronized and/or integrated with those other agencies of the U.S. government,”³³ it also recognizes the difficulty of doing so. Many sources highlight the difficulty in achieving consensus between the various departments. They cite differences in goals, policies, procedures, decision making techniques, and culture. Civil-military coordination faces those same challenges, creating difficulties during any planning since “there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations.”³⁴

The joint military planning system is a very thorough yet complex process covering numerous planning participants from military field commanders up to the NCA. Combatant commanders are charged with the responsibility for developing and coordinating integrated contingency operations and other plans as assigned in the UCP, UNAAF, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)³⁵. Integration in the planning process is achieved through the use of a system known as the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES provides standardized policies, procedures, and reporting structures and encompasses the entire Joint Planning And Execution Community (JPPEC) (Fig 7)³⁶. Under the current

Our most recent National Security Strategy (NSS), December 2000, describes the need to use an appropriate combination of diplomacy, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, military, and other tools in meeting the demands of our compelling national interests.³¹ Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces,

process, integration and synchronization of military operations with the capabilities of the other national elements of power (DIME) takes place at both the theater and national levels. Although




FIGURE 7 JOINT PLANNING & EXECUTION COMMUNITY

the combatant commander and his staff may coordinate with the ambassadors in the various countries throughout the CINC's area of responsibility (AOR), theater plans are still not coordinated at the theater operational and strategic levels during the deliberate planning process. The CINC's political advisor (POLAD), while primarily an advisor, can play a role in reviewing plans and making

recommendations during the deliberate planning process, and often works with the CINC's staff and the country team assigned to a particular embassy to assist with the interagency coordination during crisis or contingency situations.³⁷ A recent joint staff initiative has attempted to significantly improve the interagency coordination above the CINC's level. At the national strategic level, during the deliberate planning process, the joint staff coordinates portions of the combatant commander's plans with the interagency participants. Specifically, the joint staff coordinates those aspects of military plans dealing with interagency support and integration through a new process known as the "Annex V" coordination process. Although the intent of the Annex V process is for the NSC to get more involved in the contingency planning coordination process, there has only been one plan reviewed to date.³⁸

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORGANIZATION

The U.S. Department of State is organized for foreign affairs into six geographic bureaus with one additional bureau for international organizations. These bureaus oversee diplomatic activity and programs in several countries through their coordination and communication with the ambassadors and the embassy staffs (Fig 8). The primary area of action in State Department activities, however, is at the ambassadorial level in each particular country in question. This single country focus, resulting from each ambassador's individual appointment

as the President's personal envoy to that particular country, is somewhat in contrast to the theater regional focus of any particular geographic CINC.

Joint doctrine is clear on who bears the responsibility for interagency synchronization at the theater regional level, placing it squarely on the shoulders of the joint force commander (read CINC) in charge of a particular joint operation.³⁹ While joint doctrine states that the CINC is

responsible for integrating “the elements of national power by synchronizing the efforts and optimizing the varied and extensive resources of many agencies and organizations toward a single objective or end-state,”⁴⁰ they do so with what could be described conservatively as a significant limit to directive and/or resource authority over the various agencies typically involved. Interagency coordination often is performed through an organizational instrument known as a Country Team that is formed under the supervision of an ambassador. Although the country team can often be effective, it can also suffer from some significant drawbacks as well. Each ambassador and his staff, to include the country team, has a mission focus that is at the country level. “Agencies can be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules and operating areas.”⁴¹ While the State Department does do strategic planning, it tends to be focused at the departmental level on the Secretary’s overall organizational strategic vision, vice on contingency planning. State Department representatives (ambassadors and their country teams) are very knowledgeable of the country for which they are responsible. They are extremely capable diplomats, but their planning process tends to be more temporal than procedural. The planning process they use is much more free flowing than the process and documentation focused system used by the military—JOPES.⁴²




FIGURE 8 DOS, INTERNATIONAL BUREAUS

OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Much like the Department of State, the other U.S. departments and agencies have many of the same organizational and procedural planning disconnects when it comes to interfacing with the Department of Defense and the military. Some of the more critical departments and agencies with which the military are required to effectively interface with are the Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Immigration and Naturalization, Customs, etc.

Additionally, the primary focus of many of these agencies, prior to 11 September 2001, was almost exclusively on domestic responsibilities, programs, and issues as opposed to international ones. Even those departments and/or agencies that have a portion of their organizational structure set up to focus on international issues, are arranged and focused geographically in a way that does not line up with either the Department of State's or Defense's regional alignment structure. The




FIGURE 9 TREASURY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Department of the Treasury, for example, has an Undersecretary for International Affairs that has four Deputy Assistant Secretaries focused on functional responsibilities and two Deputy Assistant Secretaries focused regionally (Fig 9).⁴³ While this portion of the Treasury organization has a familiar geographic organization to it, it is primarily focused on "advising and assisting in the formulation and execution of U.S. international economic and financial policy, including the development of policies with respect to international financial, economic, monetary, trade, investment, bilateral aid, environment, debt, development, and energy programs, including U.S. participation in the international financial institutions."⁴⁴ The Undersecretary for Enforcement's organizational structure, on the other hand, does not have a geographical layout. "This Enforcement Office is responsible for coordinating Treasury law enforcement activities and the formulation of enforcement policies for the Department. It

negotiates international agreements to engage in joint law enforcement operations, and for the exchange of financial records useful to law enforcement" (Fig 10).⁴⁵

GAPS AND WEAKNESSES IN THE EXISTING STRUCTURE/PROCESS

While the national security architecture has proven to be fairly sound over the past several decades, it has not changed much either.

There are many areas where today's architecture is not optimized for today's environment.




FIGURE 10 TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE WEAKNESSES

The current NSC structure outlined in NSPD-1 consists of PCCs, the DC, the PC, and the NSC itself. It is important to keep in mind that the PCCs are designed to function as the system's lowest level standing committees and are intended to address fairly narrowly defined topic areas from a regional or functional perspective.⁴⁶ As a reminder, Condoleezza Rice expanded this organizational structure, by adding four more functional PCCs.⁴⁷

The modified NSC structure establishes a system of committees that are segmented, narrowly focused, meet on an ad-hoc basis, and are powerless to aggressively direct any kind of interagency/cross boundary commitments, directives, plans, or budgetary adjustments. This arrangement forces the interagency to go through the extremely ponderous process of achieving consensus in order to achieve any kind of synchronization between interagency departments. Difficulties, when encountered, can either stymie or delay the entire process, or must be elevated to the next level--the DC. Even at the DC and/or PC level, the system operates based on consensus, with no one having directive authority across agency boundaries. Additionally, looking at it through the lens of military hierarchical organizations, there is no chain of command or superior/subordinate structure. It is negotiation among equals who, understandably, each have a focus and sense of priorities and timeliness that is subject to being padlocked onto their own departmental responsibilities.

While Rice filled the gap left by NSPD-1's abolishment of key contingency functions established under Clinton's PDD/NSC-56, her creation of the PCC for Contingency Planning still suffers from critical interagency coordination holes.⁴⁸ Although this PCC fills the crucial role of at least beginning the vital work of establishing, coordinating, and publishing interagency integration plans for use in contingency operations, it has several weaknesses that need to be addressed. The most significant weaknesses are that Rice's memo does not charter this PCC to conduct real-time crisis action planning, execution, or feedback functions.⁴⁹ NSPD-1 compounds this weakness by actually assigning the oversight of ongoing operations functions, outlined previously in PDD/NSC-56, to a regional PCC under the chairmanship of a State Department Deputy or Assistant Secretary.⁵⁰ Where Ridge, as the Director of Homeland Security, will fit in this arrangement is still up in the air. Today's environment of fast paced, globalized, transnational and regional threats demands a security apparatus that can not only effectively plan ahead for crises before they happen, but one that can quickly and efficiently react to unforeseen situations as they develop. The split between long-term contingency planning and crisis execution oversight functions, a less than holistic approach to the application of all the elements of power, and the complete lack of directive authority in the current organizational structure may indicate our system is not up to the task it faces.

CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE/PROCESS WEAKNESSES

These same security structure weaknesses are mirrored in the civil-military structure in many ways. Assigning a CINC as the military lead for a given regional area, charging him with synchronizing and integrating the interagency capabilities, while continuing a civil system with no single agency having executive and budgetary authority establishes the framework for less than synergistic work. A civil-military combined planning and execution process that relies on consensus to bind together organizations with broadly divergent cultures, goals, policies, and procedures, is weak at best. The ground work for inadequacy begins in the planning process.

In order to ensure synchronization, integration, and coordination between the various U.S. military departments, a common planning, coordination, and execution system is employed (JOPES). Although today's environment calls for the detailed integration of the planning and execution efforts of all the departments, agencies, and offices, there is no civil equivalent to, nor are there any existing or planned technical tie-ins to JOPES for other U.S. departments/agencies. While the Annex V, interagency planning coordination process was intended to initiate this crucial interagency coordination at the national strategic level, it has only been used once. Additionally, the theater/regional strategic interagency coordination process,

particularly during crisis action events, is not standardized between combatant commands and is often informal.

Another weakness is in the misalignment or sometimes non-existence of geographic/regional alignment of areas of responsibility between civil and military agencies of the US Government. The organizational geographic/regional boundaries of the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Defense do not coincide with each other, thereby complicating contingency planning and crisis action coordination. The impact of this is readily apparent in that CINCs often must coordinate their theater strategic or operational plans with the ambassadors from several different countries, each of whom may have goals, objectives, and desires that conflict each other and do not lend themselves to regional level integration. The long-standing unrest in the Middle-East and the ongoing U.S. attempt to thwart terrorist organizations with global reach is a good example of the complexity involved

in today's contingency environment. A conservative estimate has a minimum of 3 geographic CINCs, 4 functional CINCs, 5 Department of State Bureaus, over 20 embassies, covert CIA operatives, FBI, Treasury, and Justice all attempting to coordinate actions and reactions. The counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan alone involved at least two geographic CINCs, four functional CINCs, four State department bureaus, and numerous other U.S. government agencies (Fig 11).

There are also weaknesses at the combatant command level. Although the CINCs and their staffs can coordinate crisis actions through ambassadors and their country teams, and representatives from other governmental departments and agencies (civil liaison personnel) often show up during crises, there needs to be an interagency representation apparatus resident full time in the CINC's headquarters. The ongoing effort to thwart global terrorism has highlighted this glaring gap so much so that "the military's four major regional commanders asked




FIGURE 11 AFGHANISTAN OPERATIONS

that F.B.I. and Treasury Department agents be assigned to their staffs to improve coordination.”⁵¹

ORGANIZING FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

The long list of terrorist activities that culminated with the catastrophic attacks at the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, have significantly increased the Nation’s sense of urgency to do something to combat the global growth and boldness of terrorist and trans-national criminal organizations and to protect U.S. interests. The Hart-Rudman study stated: “without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained.”⁵² Even beyond the need to reorganize to improve the nation’s counter terrorism capabilities, the U.S. needs to do so to improve the efficiency with which the U.S. applies its national elements of power during crises and contingency events. Failure to adapt will limit our ability to achieve the desired effects in any given situation.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IMPROVEMENTS

At a minimum, the long-term, deliberate planning functions assigned to the PCC for Contingency Planning and the crisis action planning and execution oversight functions assigned to the Regional PCCs need to both be assigned to standing functional PCCs. A newly created functional PCC could be designated the PCC for Crisis Management Oversight, and could perform the real-time execution, monitoring, and direction functions during ongoing crises. The PCC for Contingency Planning could expand its functional responsibilities to cover crisis action planning as well as the long-term deliberate planning, and could be redesignated the PCC for Crisis and Contingency Planning. This arrangement would closely resemble a combatant command J-3/5 set up with a standing capability for long and short term planning and crisis management. Placing both of these functional PCCs under the oversight of a cabinet level officer with a national security focus, would create a much-needed unifying effect across civil and military planning where extensive interagency interface is expected. Even with this change, however, the arrangement will still suffer from a lack of directive authority in terms of coordinating cross boundary interagency integration. Even if Tom Ridge, in his new post as the Homeland Security Czar, is elevated to co-equal status to that of the rest of the President’s cabinet, he will still be relegated to the role of coordinator, trying to implement national policies through the other department’s resources. Additionally, his assigned focus of coordinating domestic homeland security would be too narrow a focus.

To achieve national level synergy, especially under crisis action planning and execution scenarios, the U.S. must establish a Secretary General for National Security Affairs with some

level of emergency executive and budgetary authority over the other departments. This is critical for EBO to be effective at the strategic level. “The effects-based approach is most appropriate during deliberate planning, when one can spend time on researching a potential adversary, or in crisis-action planning, when one already knows much about the enemy. The effects-based approach requires continual updating, revising, and maintaining during both peace and war.”⁵³ To achieve maximum effectiveness, national security decisions, policies, and actions must be balanced, coordinated, integrated, and synchronized across all the national elements of power. In crisis situations, the U.S. national security apparatus must have the ability to react in a unified manner without delay or debate. Although the Secretary General’s powerful executive and budgetary authority would have to be limited to those situations critical to national security, it is absolutely critical to achieving unity of effort in our national security actions.⁵⁴ Unity of effort in the planning and execution stages of a crisis also demands a certain level of geographic alignment.

DEPARTMENTAL, AGENCY, AND BUREAU ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS

Military/civil commands, departments, agencies, and foreign bureaus should be regionally aligned as similarly as possible to simplify regional coordination and planning problems and to maximize efficiency in the execution of interagency crisis operations. Without this alignment of regional responsibilities, each department’s regional goals, focus, and approach could potentially be incompatibly at odds with each other. This concept is particularly important for the Departments of Defense and State, and only to a slightly lesser degree for those portions of Justice and Treasury that deal with international issues. By aligning the regional responsibilities, interagency coordination on most crises will involve far fewer organizations with far fewer boundaries for the adversary to exploit as weaknesses. Additionally, the unity of focus will more effectively enable the U.S. to focus its national elements of power on achieving the effects necessary to achieve its overall objectives. This regional alignment, however is just the first step to solidifying the theater strategic architecture for interagency coordination.

THEATER STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS

To ensure effects-based operations are most effective at the theater strategic level, the U.S. must field regionally focused interagency planning, coordination, and execution cells at each CINC to enable sound interagency crisis action planning and execution. Representatives from each department/agency must be empowered to make real time policy, planning and execution decisions necessary to ensure that crisis action responses are effectively integrated and are continually adjusted to ensure the desired effects are achieved. While four geographic

combatant commands have asked for greater interagency representation on their staffs, particularly from the F.B.I., CIA, and Treasury, the civil departments, agencies, and bureaus have been resistant.⁵⁵ In conducting the war against terrorism,

General Franks, CINCCENTCOM, has

structured his staff to utilize just such interagency representation, with the goal of increasing the likelihood that the wide-ranging desired effects continue to be achievable (Fig 12).⁵⁶




FIGURE 12 CINCEUR COUNTER-TERRORISM ORGANIZATION

INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY/CRISIS PLANNING

Experience has shown that civil military contingencies and crises are some of the most complex endeavors undertaken by any organization anywhere. As daunting as these crises may have been in the past they are nothing compared to the current global counter-terrorism campaign that the U.S. civil/military and interagency planning process is just now confronting. This operation is expected to be of such duration, breadth, and complexity, that significant and immediate changes to the interagency piece of the planning process are needed to ensure its resiliency for the long-term.

Each and every U.S. department and agency, in close coordination with the others, must begin developing detailed, coordinated, integrated, and synchronized plans. The planning systems/processes of the various departments and agencies must interface smoothly, and allow for a robust, rigorous interagency review of each and every endeavor. The Department of Defense's planning system, JOPES, should be mirrored by similar planning systems at State, Treasury, Justice, and other U.S. Government departments, agencies, and bureaus.

CONCLUSION

Joint Vision 2020 describes the key to achieving full spectrum military dominance as using information superiority as the glue that binds together the capabilities of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

Recognizing that in the complex crises we're likely to face today and in the

future, the military will rarely, if ever, operate unilaterally. It goes on to say "the primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality."⁵⁷

The EBO construct has begun to shed light on the complex process of planning and executing civil/military contingency operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. EBO, although still in the early stages of concept development, shows promise in providing a methodology for determining how best to achieve U.S. objectives, through the synergistic application of all of the national elements of power. There are, however, some critical structural and procedural changes in both the civil and military organizations if we are to fully enable and facilitate the application of the EBO construct in the application of the national elements of power. The U.S. must establish these organizational and procedural constructs in a way that best synchronizes our national elements of power (DIME) in a way that best ensures attainment of national and theater strategic security objectives (Fig 13).




FIGURE 13 FULL SPECTRUM EBO DOMINANCE

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ENDNOTES

¹ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Dec 2000), iii. More recent publications refer to the national elements of power as being diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). This conception is used throughout most of the remainder of this paper.

² Ibid, 19

³ David Joblonsky, "Why is Strategy Difficult," in US Army War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2001), 151, graphic modified to adapt to crisis planning and execution

⁴ John Deutch, Arnold Kantor, and Brent Scowcroft, with Chris Hornbarger, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, Jan 2001; available from <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/PrevDefChp10> , 267.

⁵ Ibid., 268

⁶ Ibid., 31-32. A stark example of this phenomenon was the economic distress in the pacific rim economies, and the economic drag effect it had on other economic systems world-wide.

⁷ Jeannine Aversa, "Economy Near Standstill in 2nd Quarter," Associated Press release, 28 Sep 2001; available from <http://schwab-news.excite.com/news/ap/010928/17/economy>

⁸ Clinton, 1-3.

⁹ Michele A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001: Strategy Driven Choices for America's Security, (National Defense University Press, Apr 2001), 62-65. Extensive listing of various studies from sources such as: Congressionally mandated reviews, Intelligence community reports and assessments, Office of the Secretary of Defense reports and studies, Service studies, Federally-funded and independent research institute studies, etc.

¹⁰ Ibid, 28, 34.

¹¹ Jeffrey McKittrick, et al., "The Revolution in Military Affairs," in Battlefield of the Future, 21st Century Warfare (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, Sep 1995), 65, 75

¹² Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC, the Pentagon, Sep 2001), 3-7

¹³ CDR Thomas E. Johnston, Robert S. Brodel, Graham A. Kessler, A Concept Framework for Effects-based Operations (Draft), (USJFCOM/J9, Aug 2001), 8

¹⁴ Ibid, ii

¹⁵ "Nth" implies a potentially infinite number of possible effects, many of which may be unforeseen, unplanned, or unexpected.

¹⁶ Johnston, 11

¹⁷ Ibid, 17

¹⁸ Ibid, iii

¹⁹ Ibid, 6

²⁰ Dr. Maris McCrabb, Concept of Operations for Effects-based Operations (ver 2.0), as published in an untitled draft Air Force Research Laboratory study for the Aerospace Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center, Aug 2001, 13

²¹ Ibid, 13, 14. Graphic of Barlow's NEV model can be found in several publications. Examples in the graphic in this text were altered from the original example of NEVs for purposes of discussion in this paper.

²² W. Craig Bledsoe, & Leslie Rigby, "Cabinets and Counselors," in USAWC Course 2: "War, National Security Policy and Strategy", Readings: Volume II (Carlisle Barracks, 30 Jul 2001), 81.

²³ Ibid., 1.

²⁴ Douglas T. Stuart, "Introduction", in Organizing for National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 2

²⁵ President of the United States George W. Bush, "National Security Presidential Directive – 1," memorandum for key government agencies, Washington, D.C., 13 Feb 2001, in USAWC Course 2: "War, National Security Policy and Strategy", Readings: Volume II (Carlisle Barracks, 30 Jul 2001, 307). It is important to note that the Regional PCCs all fall under the purview of the Secretary of State and are headed up by an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as appointed by the Secretary of State.

²⁶ Ibid., 308

²⁷ Condoleezza Rice, "Policy Coordinating Committees," memorandum for key government agencies, Washington, D.C., 24 Apr 2001, in Dr. Jablonsky's Course II, Block 2 Requirements and Readings outline, Tab E (Carlisle Barracks, Sep 2001), 2. In coordination with a joint staff initiative, it appears that this PCC will be responsible for reviewing and coordinating the Annex V "Interagency" issues in the various combatant command OPLANS during the deliberate planning process.

²⁸ Bush, 305. The NSC/DC serves as the senior sub-cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC helps to ensure that issues being raised to the NSC/PC or the NSC itself have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC consists of:

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (Chair), Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director of the OMB, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the JCS, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor to the VP, Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Commerce (for international economic issues), and a Deputy United States Trade Representative (for international economic issues).

The NSC/PC consists of:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair), Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence (for pertinent issues), CJCS (for pertinent issues), Attorney General (when invited), and Director of OMB (when invited)

The NSC consists of:

President (Chair), Vice President (alternate Chair), Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence (as a statutory advisor), CJCS (as a statutory advisor), President's Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting, Attorney General (for pertinent issues), and Director of the OMB (for pertinent issues).

²⁹ Eric Pianin, David S. Broder, "Ridge Defends His Role as Coordinator," Washington Post, available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2001/s20011119defends.htm>, 18 Nov 2001, 1

³⁰ The Joint Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Jul 2001), I-7

³¹ Clinton, 19

³² Joint Staff, I-11

³³ Ibid, I-10

³⁴ Ibid, I-11, JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I" does address, from the military perspective, how best to integrate with the interagency representatives. The main shortcoming, however, is in that there is no doctrine or guidance, in any great substance, that all interagency departments and agencies subscribe to or are governed by

³⁵ The Joint Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Pub 5-0, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1995), I-6,7

³⁶ Ibid, I-8

³⁷ The Joint Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1996), I-2

³⁸ Jim Colgary, Capt, USN, "Interagency Deliberate Planning," unpublished information paper (Washington DC:The Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), 1. DJ-5 and DJ-7 represent the CJCS on the CP PCC.

³⁹ Ibid, I-3

⁴⁰ Ibid, II-14

⁴¹ Ibid, I-3

⁴² United States Army War College faculty member, interview by author, 17 Sep 2001, Carlisle, PA.

⁴³ US Treasury Department Organization Chart, available from <http://www.treas.gov/org/treasorg.pdf>, 15 December 2001

⁴⁴ US Treasury Department Offices, available from <http://www.treas.gov/offices.html>, 15 December 2001

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Bush, 307. NSPD-1 outlines 6 regional PCCs – Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa; and 11 functional PCCs – Democracy, Human Rights, and International Organizations; International Development and Humanitarian Assistance; Global Environment; International Finance; Transnational Economic Issues; Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness; Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning; Arms Control; Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and Homeland Defense; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Records Access and Information Security; and The Trade Policy Review Group

⁴⁷ Rice, 2. Rice augmented NSPD-1 by creating the following additional PCCs: International Organized Crime, Contingency Planning, Space, and HIV/AIDS and Infectious Disease.

⁴⁸ Bush, 308

⁴⁹ Rice, 2

⁵⁰ Bush, 308.

⁵¹ Eric Schmitt, "4 Commanders Say They Want Civilian Agents," New York Times, available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/nov2001/e20011120commanders.htm>, 20 Nov 2001, 1

⁵² J. Michael Waller, "Preparing for the Next Pearl Harbor," in Insight on News, available from http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1571/23_17/75706939/print.jhtml, 18 Jun 2001, pg 3

⁵³ Robert D. Pollock, LtCol, "Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches to Operation Deliberate Force," in Deliberate Force, A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed Col Robert C. Owen, (Montgomery: Air University Press, 2000), 444-445

⁵⁴ Robert D. Steele, "Presidential Leadership and National Security Policy Making," in Organizing for National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 254-255

⁵⁵ Schmitt, 1

⁵⁶ Barbara Fast, Brigadier General, "Theater Level Intelligence Support to the CINC," lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 19 December 2001, cited with permission of BG Fast

⁵⁷ Henry H. Shelton, Gen, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: The Pentagon), 2-3, 18

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